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Abstract:  
Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to 
climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of 
offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a “global insurance scheme” to be financed 
according to countries’ responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very 
slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis 
of cumulated emissions, rather than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in 
a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-
sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) 
to a context with externalities. 
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, climate change is a notion pervading our collective human psyche,
from policy design to everyday conversations, usually under the more casual des-
ignation of "global warming". Accompanying our awareness of climatic change
is the growing realization that the impacts of global warming are not uniformly
distributed across the globe. Yet, by itself, the fact that countries are unequally
a¤ected by climate change does not warrant a cry against injustice. Indeed, if
the regions most a¤ected by climate change were also the ones contributing to
it the most, the observation would be less shocking. However, when comparing
maps of recent and cumulated emissions with that of temperature anomalies,
one cannot help but notice that they do not coincide (Figure 1). Add to it the
fact that the melting of icecaps resulting from climate change will dispropor-
tionately impact coastal cities, and it becomes clear that some countries end up
generating more harm than they endure, while others must absorb more damage
than they cause. In other words, under the near-consensual assumption that the
increase in human activity has contributed to climate change, climate change is
a prime example of a global externality.
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Figure 1. Left, up: per capita GHG emissions by country in 2000; left, down,
per capita responsibility in cumulated emissions of GHG. Right, likelihood
that future average summer temperatures exceed the highest temperature
observed on record. Up, for the period 2040-2060; down, for 2080-2100.
Sources: World Resources Institute, via Wikipedia, for emissions; and Science,
vol. 323 (Jan. 9th, 2009) for temperatures.
Yet, because the discrepancy between the distribution of GHG emissions in
the atmosphere, and their resulting impacts, is due to "natural" phenomena
(e.g., winds, currents, the melting of icecaps, etc.), and because it is impossible
to trace back to its origin the damage borne by any given region, we argue
that the distribution of damages lies beyond the responsibility of any country.
Nonetheless, provided the aggregate environmental impact of climate change as
well as emissions patterns of each country are observable, one can hope to solve
this global cost-sharing problem of sorts.
We argue in favor of a global insurance scheme that washes out di¤erences in
the distributions of damages, for which countries are not responsible. Similarly,
the nancing of this scheme should holds countries responsible for the (global)
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damage for which they are indeed responsible.
A standard approach to implementing the rst-best level of pollution is
through Pigou taxes (or equivalent schemes), which succeed by making polluters
internalize the social marginal cost of their externality (pigou, 1932; Baumol,
1972; Nordhaus, 1992). While the "polluter pays" principle behind this ap-
proach is very appealing, Pigou taxation can only perform satisfactorily when
the social marginal cost can be reasonably well approximated. However, given
that the lifetime of GHG emissions may last more than hundreds or even thou-
sands of years (see Archer, 2005, and Archer and Brovkin, 2008), Pigou taxation
is based on expected costs of uncertain events far o¤ in the future, which are
very di¢ cult to estimate in practice (Stern 2008). In addition, Pigou taxa-
tion is silent on the question of discounting these future costs over hundreds of
years and on the normative question of intergenerational equity. Lastly, even
if the rst-best level of emissions is reached, some climate change will occur
(as a result of past and current emissions), because some pollution is e¢ cient.
Pigou taxation does not explicitly handle the normative question of horizontal
(or intra-generational) equity raised by the imbalance between the distribution
of emissions and the distribution of damages.
We propose an alternative approach to Pigou taxation which overcomes
the shortcomings identied above while remaining entirely compatible with the
Pigovian outcome (i.e., a rst-best pollution level). The key feature of our ap-
proach is that it does not rely on estimates of future costs, but rebalances the
distribution of current (known) damages each period, thus also circumventing
the issue of discounting. Within each period, we treat the issue as a traditional
cost-sharing problem, where damages depend on countries past and current
emissions. We address the issue of global equity by expliciting the responsibility
of countries to the global damage according to their past and current emissions
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as well as other characteristics (GDP, geographical location, population, etc.).
We are fully aware that the debate on countriesresponsibilities for past emis-
sions is still raging, and it is a debate which is beyond the scope of this work.
Nonetheless, our approach is exible enough to accomodate the most prominent
competing ideologies, precisely because we let the planner decide explicitly the
characteristics for which countries are to be held responsible.
More precisely, the responsibility/compensation approach we adopt is re-
lated to that in Bossert & Fleurbaey (1996) in that the planners rst decision
is to identify for which characteristics countries should be held responsible and
for which characteristics they should be held "non responsible" and thus com-
pensated. For instance, in our context, the planner may deem that current
populations are responsible for their current GHG emissions and must there-
fore pay for all the resulting damages, but that they are not responsible for
their geographical location and corresponding climate, and that their cost share
should not depend on their geographical location, all else equal (emissions, in
particular). Yet, a tension already arises from this seemingly innocent deci-
sion. For example, according to the planner, a country which experiences cold
winters, like Canada, should be held responsible for its emissions but at the
same time should be compensated for the fact that its emissions are high due
to heating needs. In fact, it has been established (Bossert, 1995) that holding
economic agents fully responsible for some characteristics was incompatible with
full compensation along the other characteristics unless the cost function is sep-
arable along the responsibility/compensation dimensions. Because one cannot
reasonably assume such separability, the two taxation schemes that will stand
out from our analysis (the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Conditionally Equiv-
alent mechanisms) result from compromises between full compensation and full
responsibility.
5
From a policy standpoint, our ndings show that environmental taxation
à la Pigou, which is often considered the epitome of responsibilization, pop-
ularized by its implementation of the rst-best pollution levels, is compatible
with a modicum of compensation for di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics.
In particular, the Conditionally Equivalent solution can be viewed as a Pigou
tax followed by redistributive transfers. To the best of our knowledge, it pro-
vides the rst axiomatic specication of how to allocate the Pigou tax revenues,
both to wash out the damages su¤ered by each country, and for cross-country
compensation.
1.1 A reverse approach to taxation
The leveling of environmental damage presented above requires possibly large
funds, equal to the sum of all climate-change-related damage across the globe.
Indeed, if we denote by dit the environmental damage su¤ered by country i due
to climate change over a given period, t, the total amount of funds necessary
to cancel out the damage for all countries in that period adds up to Dt P
i;t dit.
1 Obviously, given the global nature of the issue, the nancing of the
levelling compensation must be collectively borne by the very same countries
which are receiving these compensations. Hence, the leveling compensation is,
in essence, a redistribution mechanism designed to counter the arbitrary nature
of the distribution of climate-change damage across the globe.
Two arguments are in order. First, given that we consider climate change
to be closely related to GHG emissions, we argue that the damage-o¤setting
scheme should be nanced in relation to the countriesemission levels, via a tax
on emissions of sorts.2 Ideally, this tax should be set so as to achieve e¢ cient
1The dynamic nature of the problem and the relation between damage and carbon emissions
will be made explicit below, as needed in the argumentation.
2Naturally, this point becomes moot if the planner believes climate change to be completely
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emission levels. However, we take the view that emissions are like environ-
mental debt issued by polluters at all times s < t, a portion of which will be
collected over time in the form of the environmental damage Dt. Therefore,
unlike the common Pigovian view that the emissions tax should be set equal to
the discounted expected future social marginal damage (Nordhaus, 1992), the
mechanism we propose repays the "debt", Dt, of observed environmental dam-
age each period. Thus, our approach avoids the problematic issue of accurately
evaluating expected future costs of uncertain future events, which proves ex-
tremely di¢ cult in practice (see, e.g., Sterns AEA presidential address 2008).
This task is all the more di¢ cult as carbon emissions may persist in the at-
mosphere for up to thousands of years, thus making unrealistic the estimation
of future damage so far in the future. Instead, by basing the emissions tax
on current observed environmental damage, our mechanism circumvents this
di¢ cult estimation issue entirely3 .
An additional benet of our "reverse" approach compared to the forward-
looking one is that it circumvents another very problematic issue related to the
large lifetime of CO2 emissions: intergenerational discounting. Indeed, discount-
ing beyond several decades already poses the delicate question of how to consider
future costs or benets. In other words, it is not just the discount rate itself
which is contentious, but the very nature of the discounting (e.g., exponential
versus hyperbolic, see Henderson and Bateman, 1995). With the timespans in-
volved by CO2 emissions covering possibly hundreds or even thousands of years,
it seems foolish to envision being able to reach any non-controversial present val-
ues of environmental damage. By contrast, our "reverse" approach bypasses the
issue entirely due to the fact that period-per-period optimizing countries will
unrelated to human activity. In that case, the rest of our analysis can be interpreted as
tackling the issue of the arbitrariness of climate change which is considered to be happening,
regardless of the causes.
3Evaluating current damages remains a di¢ cult task, but a considerably less daunting one
than predicting damage occurring in the distant future.
7
behave as if they had anticipated expected future damage. Indeed, we show
by a simple dynamic programming argument in a companion paper (Billette de
Vllemeur and Leroux, 2010) that the usual, forward-looking Pigovian tax, un-
der rational expectations, coïncides with our "reverse" scheme. The intuition is
that each country would correctly anticipate the impact of its current emissions
on future damages and respond according to its own discount rate.
1.2 Compensation and responsibility
We now address the question of who will pay how much. Given our responsibility-
based approach to fairness, this nal discussion amounts to sorting out the
responsibility of each country in the matter. We adopt the following general
principle: "Countries should pay for damage caused for which they are respon-
sible and be compensated for damage su¤ered for which they are not". Hence,
our approach allows one to make recommendations based on the planners as-
signment of responsibilities (which is beyond the scope of this work). More
precisely, the resulting cost shares will be tailored to reect this assignment of
responsibilities, whether it considers that countries are fully responsible for all
historical emissions (what we call the Historical Responsibility view) or whether
one deems climate change to be independent of CO2 emissions (what we call
the External Shock view).
Our approach is related to that of Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey and Bossert
(1996) in that we separate country charateristics into two categories: that of
"relevant" characteristics for which countries are deemed responsible and which
are related to climate change (i.e., possibly past and present emissions), and
"irrelevant" characteristics for which countries should not be held responsible
or which are unrelated to climate change (i.e., aspects of geographical location
like latitude and coastality; and possibly emissions, depending on the point of
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view). Then, we formulate axioms which any taxation rule must verify to be
compatible with the desired view of responsibility adopted by the planner.
Ideally, one would want to hold countries fully responsible for di¤erences in
their relevant characteristics while being fully compensated for di¤erences in
their irrelevant characteristics. Unfortunately, a strong tension exists between
these considerations of responsibility and compensation, making them typically
incompatible in their strong versions except for unreasonably simplistic case of
a linear damage function. Therefore, when deciding on what sharing rule to
implement, the planner faces a trade-o¤ between relaxing the extent to which
countries are held responsible for their relevant emissions and the extent to which
they can be compensated for di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics. The type
of cost-sharing mechanisms that emerge from our analysis consists in holding
countries responsible or compensating them for di¤erences in characteristics,
not among themselves per se, but relative to a reference level. Thus, while
still taking di¤erences in characteristics into account, cost allocation becomes
mathematically feasible, at the expense of being able to charge strictly according
to marginal costs. Hence, the possible solutions we o¤er will di¤er in how
strongly they depart from marginal-cost pricing.
More specically, one of the two solutions we propose, the Egalitarian Equiv-
alent mechanism, splits the consequences of deviations from a reference vector
of irrelevant characteristics while sharing equally the residual impact of global
warming, once each country has paid for its incremental contribution4 . In other
words, the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism prices emissions at incremental
cost while balancing the budget via lump-sum transfers based on countriesir-
relevant characteristics. In the responsibility-compensation spectrum, one could
argue that the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism insists on compensation at the
4The incremental cost is the additional cost imposed by the presence of an additional agent,
as opposed to an additional unit of emissions (as is the case for marginal cost). Clearly, the
smaller the emissions of a country, the closer the incremental cost is to the marginal cost.
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expense of responsibility.
Symmetrically, the second solution we propose, the Conditionally Equivalent
mechanism guarantees each agent the average payo¤ of a hypothetical situation
in which all countries have the characteristics they are responsible for equal to
a reference level. Each country bears the consequences of any deviation from
this reference level. As such, the Conditionally Equivalent mechanism insists on
countriesresponsibility at the expense of compensation considerations. Because
countries are (marginally) taxed according to marginal damage, it is akin to
Pigou taxation, thus implementing the rst-best level of emissions.
Our compensation-responsibility approach builds upon that developed in
Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) after adapting it to a context
of externalities. Indeed, their setting focuses on wealth redistribution in the ab-
sence of externalities, which would be tantamount to assuming a damage func-
tion which is separable in the countriesemissions levels. Such an assumption
would be ill-adapted in our context. By contrast, our setup introduces inter-
dependence between the countriescharacteristics (emission levels) through the
damage function. As a result, the analysis allows for applications in more gen-
eral settings where externalities are present. Moreover, our results conrm and
extend the appeal of the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Conditionally Equiva-
lent solutions to the more general context of externalities.
2 The model
Let S = f1; :::;mg  N be the set of countries5 . We denote by ni the population
of country i and by n = (n1; :::; nm) 2 Nm the population prole. We write
N =
Pm
i=1 ni. We denote by xi = (x
p
i ; x
c
i ) 2 R2 country is vector of past and
5We use the word "countries" for simplicity, but our analysis readily applies to regions,
which is especially relevant for large countries.
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current6 per capita emissions, by xp = (xp1; ::x
p
n) and x
c = (xc1; ::x
c
n) the past
and current per capita GHG emissions proles, respectively.7
Each countrys per capita private current benets are associated to its own
emissions levels via a mapping bi : R2+ ! R, (xpi ; xci ) 7! bi (xpi ; xci ),8 which is
continuous and non-decreasing in each argument. We assume benets to be
fully transferable across countries. Let b = (b1; ::; bm) be the prole of per
capita benet functions, one per country. We interpret the di¤erences in the
benet functions across countries to be essentially geographic in nature (latitude,
altitude, coastality, etc.).9
In contrast with private benets, which are solely dependent upon a coun-
trys own emissions, per capita country environmental damage will depend on
total emissions. More precisely, let X =
P
i=1;:::;m nixi be the total level of
emissions, where xi = x
p
i + x
c
i designates country is cumulated emissions
10 .
Whenever convenient, we write X i =
P
j 6=i njxj Formally, we denote by di (X)
the current per capita damage incurred by country i. We do not make any as-
sumption on the functions di (X) other than continuity. In particular, it may
be the case that some countries actually benet from global warming for some
values of X. That is to say we do not exclude the possibility that di (X) < 0
6From a practical standpoint, current emissions can be interpreted as emissions in the very
recent past, say, between 5 and 8 years. This time frame could coincide with the reevaluation
periods of the major international protocols (Kyoto, Copenhagen, etc.).
7To lighten notation, we do not index variables by their time subscript. It will be implicit
throughout that all the analysis takes place at time t, and that xc = xct while x
p =
P
s<t x
c
s.
More generally, any value decribed as "current" will refer to a value at time t.
8While bi is not necessarily independent of the countrys population, ni, we do not explicitly
consider variations in ni. Moreover, we make no hypothesis on how bi should vary with ni.
9We formulate the model on a per-capita basis in order to account for the relative sizes
of the various countries. Given the large heterogeneity in country size across the globe, per-
country considerations would bias the analysis.
10For simplicity, we assume ni to be constant over time. While this assumption is unrealistic,
its consequence is mainly one of accounting. Our goal is to focus on the role of relevant and
irrelevant characteristics. It will become clear that we view population as a "neutral" variable,
i.e., belonging to neither category.
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for some countries: Nonethless, we assume total damage,
D (X) =
mX
i=1
nidi (X) ;
to be positive and non-decreasing in X:We denote by d = (d1; :::dm) the prole
of per capita damage functions. Finally, we call (n; b; d; xp; xc) a global warming
problem and denote by P the class of such problems.
Our goal is to design a transfer schedule to correct the arguably uneven dis-
tribution of damage due to global warming while providing incentives for coun-
tries to reduce their emissions, possibly up to inducing full e¢ ciency. Formally,
this amounts to compensating every country for the per capita damage it incurs,
di(X), while setting up vectors of per capita transfer payments, ti (n; b; d; xp; xc),
to nance the total amount compensated:
P
i niti (n; b; d; x
p; xc) = D(X). The
per capita payo¤ of country i is then bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )   ti (n; b; d; xp; xc). We are in-
terested in transfer functions, t : P ! Rn which (potentially) hold countries
responsible for their past and current emissions levels, xpi and x
c
i , while fully
washing out the damage su¤ered, di.
Throughout the paper, we consider that countries are not responsible for
their damage function, di, nor their benet function bi. Moreover, we consider
a countrys population, ni, to be a "neutral" characteristic in the sense that it
does not warrant compensation (it is not an irrelevant characteristic) nor reward
(it is not a relevant characteristic). We contrast several views of responsibility
regarding emissions. First, since the cost of global warming depends upon to-
tal emissions, one may argue that countries should be held responsible for all
of their emissions, both past and current: We shall call this view Historical
Responsibility (hereafter HR). Second, one may argue instead that countries
should not be held responsible for emissions that go back to a time when the im-
pact of GHG emissions on climate change had not been suspected. According to
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this view, past emissions are irrelevant and countries should be held responsible
only for current emissions levels xc = (xc1; :::; x
c
m). We refer to it as noHistorical
Responsibility (hereafter nHR). Third, past emissions may be considered a
natural benchmark to measuring countriesneeds. According to this so-called
Grand-Fathering view (hereafter GF), countries are held responsible for vari-
ations between current and past emissions levels xGF = (xGF1 ; :::; x
GF
m ); where
xGFi = x
c
i   xpi , for some parameter  possibly reecting technical progress.
Finally, some still argue that no causal link between human emissions and cli-
mate change can be ascertained. According to this fourth viewpoint, which we
shall call the External Shock view (henceforth, ES), countriesemissions levels
are irrelevant in redistributing the costs associated with climate change. Note
that the ES view is not at odds with the desire to redistribute the impacts of
climate change; it simply assumes that damages are not caused by emissions.11
Prior to further investigating the concepts of responsibility and compensa-
tion in a global warming context, we impose two minimal fairness requirement.
Anonymity requires countries with identical characteristics to be treated equally,
while Solidarity asks that no country benets from seeing the damage of other
countries suddenly increase, all else equal.12
Axiom 1 (Anonymity) For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P, and any i; j 2 S,
(bi; x
p
i ; x
c
i ) = (bj ; x
p
j ; x
c
j) =) ti (P ) = tj (P )
Axiom 2 (Solidarity) For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) and P 0 = (n; b; d0; xp; xc)
11For readibility, the remainder of the paper formulates the global warming problem accord-
ing to the HR view. The corresponding results obtained under the other views of responsibility
and can be found in the Appendix.
12See, e.g., Thomson (2003) for a comprehensive survey of the use of these standard axioms
in the cost-sharing literature.
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such that d0j  dj for all j 2 S,
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti(P 0)  bi(xpi ; xci )  ti(P );
for all i 2 S:
3 Responsibility and compensation
3.1 Penalizing (or rewarding) for di¤erences in relevant
characteristics
If countries are considered to be responsible for at least some of their emis-
sions, di¤erences in these emissions should a¤ect their nal payo¤s. In fact, a
strong interpretation of responsibility consists in holding countries fully respon-
sible for the damage they contribute to causing via "relevant" emissions, for
which they are considered responsible, irrespective of other, "irrelevant" emis-
sions, if any. A rst approach to responsibility consists in arguing that whatever
the distribution of irrelevant characteristics, changes in one countrys relevant
characteristics, should a¤ect only this country. This yields:
Axiom 3 (FMR) Full Marginal Responsibility:
Consider a change from P to P^ where some country is emissions change from
(xpi ; x
c
i ) to (x^
p
i ; x^
c
i ), all else equal
13 , then:
ti

P^

  ti (P ) =
D

X^

 D (X)
ni
;
and tj

P^

= tj (P ) for all j 6= i:
13We opted for an informal statement for the sake of readability. Formally, the statement
should read: "For any i 2 S, and any P , P^ 2 P such that (n^; b^; d^) = (n; b; d) and (x^pj ; x^cj) =
(xpj ; x
c
j) for all j 2 Snfig, the following holds:..."
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Full Marginal Responsibility is a very demanding axiom as it requires each
country to pay the full marginal cost of its own emissions. In fact, it follows
from a familiar argument in the cost-sharing literature (e.g., Leroux, 2004) that
unless D is linear, no budget-balanced transfer function satises FMR:
Proposition 1 No cost-sharing mechanism satises FMR unless the damage
function, D, is linear in total emissions, X:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.1
This negative result is due to the fact that the notion of marginal damage
becomes blurry for non-linear damage functions. This leads us to considering a
less demanding axiom, which insists on assigning marginal responsibilities when
damage is linear:
Axiom 4 (LMR) Linear Marginal Responsibility:
Suppose individual damage functions are linear. Consider a change from P to
P^ where some countrys emissions change from (xpi ; x
c
i ) to (x^
p
i ; x^
c
i ), for some i,
all else equal, then:
ti

P^

  ti (P ) =
D

X^

 D (X)
ni
;
and tj

P^

= tj (P ) for all j 6= i
Solidarity and LMR together imply that one should charge countries a per-
unit cost equal to the average (and marginal) global damage.
Proposition 2 LMR and Solidarity imply Average Damage Pricing:
ti (P ) = xi
D (X)
X
:
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
Hence, it would seem that the rather weak axiom of LMR points to a strong
characterization of average damage pricing. While formally correct, we argue
that this result relies heavily on a reference level (zero emissions) which we deem
inappropriate in our context: granting such a special role to the unattainable
(and undesirable) outcome of zero emissions is ill-suited to handling an e¢ cient,
or merely a realistic emissions level. Instead, we allow for the planner to de-
cide on the appropriate reference emissions level ~X. In practice, this reference
level, ~X, can be thought of as a target emissions level. In that case, the ratio
D(X) D( ~X)
X  ~X approximates the notion of marginal damage around the reference
level ~X. The corresponding axiom, Full Reference Responsibility asks that coun-
tries be held responsible for departures from the reference level on a per capita
basis:
Axiom 5 (FRR) Full Reference Responsibility:
Let (~xp; ~xc) 2 R2+ be a reference vector of per capita emissions and dene total
reference emissions accordingly: eX = Pj=1;:::;m nj ~x, with ~x = ~xp + ~xc.
For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P, and any ~P = (n; b; d; ~xp  1m; ~xc  1m) 2 P,
where 1m stands for the m-unit vector,
ti (P )  ti

~P

= (xi   ~x)
24D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
35 ;
for all i 2 S:
Remark 1 Clearly, if the damage function, D, is linear, FMR and FRR coin-
cide.
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A complementary interpretation of responsibility is that each country must
pay the incremental damage it imposes onto the rest of society:14
ti(P )  ti(P jxi=(0;0)) =
D (X) D (X i)
ni
:
Holding countries responsible only for their relevant characteristics implies that
the transfer ti(P jxi=(0;0)) should not depend on characteristics for which coun-
tries are not deemed responsible:
Axiom 6 (ECEIC) Equal Contribution for Equal Irrelevant Charac-
teristics15
[bi = bj ] =)
ti (P )  D (X) D (X i)
ni
= tj (P )  D (X) D (X j)
nj
:
A weaker version only requires an equal contribution when all countries
irrelevant characteristics are identical to a reference.
Axiom 7 (ECRIC) Equal Contribution for Reference Irrelevant Char-
acteristics.
Consider a reference benet function, ~b, then:
If bi = ~b for all i 2 S, then:
ti (P )  D (X) D (X i)
ni
= tj (P )  D (X) D (X j)
nj
for all i; j 2 S.
Remark 2 Clearly, FMR is a more demanding axiom than FRR, and ECEIC
14The shorthand notation P jxi=(0;0) designates a global warming problem identical to P in
every way except for country is emissions, which are zero. Recall that we are adopting the
HR view of responsibility. For instance, under the nHR view, the analog would be P jxci=0.
15This axiom, and others considered here, result from adapting axioms found in Bossert
(1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities.
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is more demanding than ECRIC. However, no such relationship exists between
FRR and ECEIC.16
3.2 Compensating for di¤erences in irrelevant character-
istics
A rst approach to dealing with the issue of compensation consists in arguing
that di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics should not drive their welfare. In
other words, only di¤erences in relevant characteristics should matter.
The above argument can be interpreted to mean that all should equally
su¤er or benet as a result of a change in one countrys irrelevant character-
istic:
Axiom 8 (GSIC) Group Solidarity towards Irrelevant Characteristics.
Consider a change from bi to b^i, for some i, all else equal. Denote P =
(n; b; d; xp; xc) and P^ = (n; b^; d; xp; xc), then:
tj (P )  tj

P^

=
h
b^i(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti

P^
i
  [bi(xpi ; xci )  ti (P )]
for all j 6= i.
Remark 3 Under GSIC, budget balance implies
ti (P )  ti

P^

= (1  ni
N
)(bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  b^i(xpi ; xci )); and
tj (P )  tj

P^

=
ni
N
(bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  b^i(xpi ; xci ))
for all j 6= i.
Another interpretation of compensation consists in requiring that citizens
16 In the absence of externalities, FMR coincides FRR and implies ECEIC (Bossert and
Fleurbaey, 1996).
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of two countries with identical relevant characteristics should end up with the
same payo¤:
Axiom 9 (EPER) Equal Payo¤ for Equal Responsibility.
For all i; j 2 S, [xi = xj ] =)
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = bj(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P ) :
A considerably weaker version of the above axiom requires nal payo¤ equal-
ity only in when the relevant characteristics of all countries are equal to a given
reference level.
Axiom 10 (EPRR) Equal Payo¤ for Reference Responsibility.
Let (~xp; ~xc) 2 R2+ be a reference vector of per capita emissions. If (xpi ; xci ) =
(~xp; ~xc) for all i 2 S, then:
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = bj(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P ) ;
for all i; j 2 S:
Remark 4 Clearly, EPER is more demanding than EPRR. However, no such
relationship between GSIC and the other two axioms.17
3.3 Tension between compensation and responsibility
As it turns out, it is generally impossible to compensate countries for di¤erences
in irrelevant characteristics while penalizing or rewarding them for di¤erences in
relevant characteristics, at least in the strong interpretation of these concepts.
In fact, even when D (X) is linear, FMR (or FRR) and GSIC are incompatible
17 If population had been considered an "irrelevant" characteristic, then GSIC would be
stronger than EPER, as in Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996). The proof is available upon request.
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unless the benet function is additively separable in countries relevant and
irrelevant characteristics.
Proposition 3 Suppose D is linear. GSIC and FMR are incompatible unless
all benet functions are identical up to a constant; i.e, unless there exists a
vector  2 Rn and a function h : R2+ ! R such that
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i ) = i + h(x
p
i ; x
c
i )
for all (xpi ; x
c
i ) 2 R2+:
Proof. In Appendix A.3.2.
Consequently, the only way to reconcile the concepts of compensation and
responsibility is to weaken at least one of the two axioms. We discuss these
weakenings in turn and characterize the corresponding mechanisms in the next
section.
4 The Egalitarian Equivalent and the Condition-
ally Equivalent mechanisms
4.1 The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism
The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism splits the consequences of deviations
from a reference vector of irrelevant characteristics while sharing equally the
residual impact of global warming, after each country has paid for its incremental
contribution:
Denition 1 Egalitarian Equivalent transfer:
Let P 2 P and consider a reference vector of irrelevant characteristics ~b: Then,
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for any i 2 S,
tHR EEi (P ) = bi (x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ~b (xpi ; xci ) +
1
ni
[D (X) D (X i)] (1)
 
mX
j=1
nj
N
h
bj
 
xpj ; x
c
j
  ~b  xpj ; xcji
  1
N
0@ mX
j=1
[D (X) D (X j)] D(X)
1A :
The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism is characterized by the combination
of GSIC and ECRIC.
Theorem 1 A transfer schedule, t, satises GSIC and ECRIC if and only if
t = tHR EE :
Proof. See the Appendix A.2.2.
Remark 5 The above characterization is tight: the strengthening of ECRIC
into ECEIC yields an impossibility. Indeed, the reader can check that the EE
solution does not satisfy ECEIC.
4.2 The Conditionally Equivalent mechanism
The Conditionally Equivalent mechanism guarantees each agent the average
payo¤ of a hypothetical situation in which all countriesrelevant characteristics
are equal to a reference level. Each country bears the consequences of any
deviation from this reference level. Formally,
Denition 2 Conditionally Equivalent (CE) transfer:
Let P 2 P and consider a reference vector of relevant characteristics (~xp; ~xc) 2
R2+.
21
For any i 2 S,
tHR CEi (P ) = bi(~x
p; ~xc) + (xi   ~x)
0@D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
1A (2)
  1
N
0@ mX
j=1
njbj(~x
p; ~xc) D( ~X)
1A ;
where ~X =
P
j2N nj

~x:
The CE mechanism is characterized by FRR and EPRR.
Theorem 2 A transfer schedule, t, satises FRR and EPRR if and only if
t = tHR CE :
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Remark 6 The above characterization is tight: the strengthening of EPRR into
EPER yields an impossibility. Indeed, the reader can check that the CE solution
does not satisfy EPER.
5 Conclusion
The following table summarizes the relationship between the axioms considered
thus far.
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Table 1
Axioms GSIC EPER EPRR
FMR x x x
FRR x x tCE
ECEIC x x x
ECRIC tEE x x
As in the theory on responsibility and compensation formalized by Bossert
(1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), the Egalitarian Equivalent and the
Conditional Equivalent solutions play a key role. These ndings conrm the
importance of these solutions, even in settings where externalities are present.
However, unlike in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), the (equivalent of) axioms
ECEIC and ECRIC are generally incompatible with both EPER and EPRR.18
This is due to the fact that we consider population to be a "neutral" charac-
teristic. Yet, population is a crucially important characteristic of the problem
at hand due to the fact that our approach to responsibility is at the per capita
level while data on the characteristics considered (emissions and benets in par-
ticular) are likely to only be available at the aggregate level. This dichotomy
inevitably places special emphasis on the population characteristic. Yet, while
we do not deem individuals responsible for the population of the country they
belong to (i.e., population is not a relevant characteristic), we do not believe the
taxation scheme should compensate or penalize them for it (i.e., population is
not an irrelevant characteristic either). These practical considerations illustrate
the necessity of formally introducing a third type of characteristics "neutral"
characteristics in the axiomatic analysis to responsibility and compensation.
To the best of our knowledge, no general theory has been established that con-
siders neutral characteristics.
18 It su¢ ces to show that ECRIC and EPRR are incompatible. (Appendix A.3.3)
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A Appendix
A.1 Other views on responsibility
As we mention in the body of the paper, several views of responsibility can be
considered to tackle the global warming problem. We describe below how the
analysis would be a¤ected by considering the nHR, the GF or the ES view.
A.1.1 Penalizing (or rewarding) for di¤erences in relevant charac-
teristics
Axiom 3 (FMR) Full Marginal Responsibility:
nHR-FMR Consider a change from P to P^ where some countrys emissions
change from (xpi ; x
c
i ) to (x
p
i ; x^
c
i ), for some i, all else equal, then:
ti

P^

  ti (P ) =
D

X^

 D (X)
ni
;
and tj

P^

= tj (P ) for all j 6= i:
GF-FMR Let xGFi = x
c
i   xpi : Consider a change from P to P^ where some
countrys emissions change from (xpi ; x
GF
i ) to (x
p
i ; x^
GF
i ), for some i, all
else equal, then:
ti

P^

  ti (P ) =
D

X^

 D (X)
ni
;
and tj

P^

= tj (P ) for all j 6= i:
Remark 7 The ES version of FMR is not well dened because no country
bears any responsibility in the matter.
Axiom 5 (FRR) Full Reference Responsibility:
Let (~xp; ~xc) 2 R2+ be a reference vector of per capita emissions. Dene the grand-
fathering per capita emission reference ~xGF = ~xc   ~xp accordingly. Similarily,
let eX = Pj=1;:::;m nj ~x; where ~x = ~xp+~xc; denote the total emission reference
level.
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nHR-FRR For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P,
and any ~P = (n; b; d; xp; ~xc  1m) 2 P,
ti (P )  ti

~P

= (xci   ~xc)
24D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
35 ;
for all i 2 S:
GF-FRR For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P,
and any ~P = (n; b; d; ~xp  1m; ~xc  1m) 2 P,
ti (P )  ti

~P

=
 
xGFi   ~xGF
24D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
35
for all i 2 S:
Remark 8 Again, the ES version of FRR is not well dened because no coun-
try bears any responsibility in the matter.
Axiom 6 (ECEIC) Equal Contribution for Equal Irrelevant Characteristics.
nHR-ECEIC [bi = bj and x
p
i = x
p
j ] =)
ti (P )  D (X) D (X   nix
c
i )
ni
= tj (P ) 
D (X) D  X   njxcj
nj
;
for all i; j 2 S.
GF-ECEIC [bi = bj and x
p
i = x
p
j ] =)
ti (P ) 
D (X) D  X   nixGFi 
ni
= tj (P ) 
D (X) D  X   njxGFj 
nj
;
for all i; j 2 S.
ES-ECEIC [bi = bj, x
p
i = x
p
j , and x
c
i = x
c
j ] =)
ti (P ) = tj (P ) ;
for all i; j 2 S.
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Axiom 7 (ECRIC) Equal Contribution for Reference Irrelevant Characteris-
tics.
Consider a reference benet function, ~b, and a reference emissions vector, (~xp; ~xc).
nHR-ECRIC If [bi = ~b, and x
p
i = ~x
p] for all i 2 S, then:
ti (P )  D (X) D (X   nix
c
i )
ni
= tj (P ) 
D (X) D  X   njxcj
nj
;
for all i; j 2 S.
GF-ECRIC If [bi = ~b and x
p
i = ~x
p] for all i 2 S =)
ti (P ) 
D (X) D  X   nixGFi 
ni
= tj (P ) 
D (X) D  X   njxGFj 
nj
;
for all i; j 2 S.
ES-ECRIC If [bi = ~b, x
p
i = ~x
p, and xci = ~x
c] for all i 2 S =)
ti (P ) = tj (P ) ;
for all i; j 2 S.
A.1.2 Compensating for di¤erences in irrelevant characteristics.
Axiom 8 (GSIC) Group Solidarity towards Irrelevant Characteristics.
For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P, any i 2 S,
nHR-GSIC Consider a change from bi to b^i and from x
p
i to x^
p
i , for some i,
all else equal. Denote P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) and P^ = (n; b^; d; x^p; xc), then:
tj (P )  tj

P^

=
h
b^i(x^
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti

P^
i
  [bi(xpi ; xci )  ti (P )]
for all j 6= i.
GF-GSIC Consider a change from bi to b^i and from (x
p
i ; x
c
i ) to (x^
p
i ; x^
c
i ), for
some i, all else equal, such that xGFi = x^
GF . Denote P = (n; b; d; xp; xc)
and P^ = (n; b^; d; x^p; x^c), then:
tj (P )  tj

P^

=
h
b^i(x^
p
i ; x^
c
i )  ti

P^
i
  [bi(xpi ; xci )  ti (P )]
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for all j 6= i.
ES-GSIC Consider a change from bi to b^i and from (x
p
i ; x
c
i ) to (x^
p
i ; x^
c
i ), for
some i, all else equal. Denote P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) and P^ = (n; b^; d; x^p; x^c),
then:
tj (P )  tj

P^

=
h
b^i(x^
p
i ; x^
c
i )  ti

P^
i
  [bi(xpi ; xci )  ti (P )]
for all j 6= i.
Axiom 9 (EPER) Equal Payo¤ for Equal Responsibility19 .
For any P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P,
nHR-EPER xci = x
c
j =)
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = b(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P ) :
GF-EPER xGFi = x
GF
j =)
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = b(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P )
ES-EPER In all cases:
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = b(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P )
for all i; j 2 S:
Axiom 10 (EPRR) Equal Payo¤ for Reference Responsibility.
Let (~xp; ~xc) 2 R2+ be a reference vector of per capita emissions.
nHR-EPRR If xci = ~x
c for all i 2 S, then:
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = bj(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P ) ;
for all i; j 2 S:
GF-EPRR If xGFi = ~x
GF for all i 2 S, then:
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = bj(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P ) ;
for all i; j 2 S:
19This axiom, and others considered here, results from the reinterpretation of an axiom
found in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
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ES-EPRR In all cases:
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ti (P ) = bj(xpj ; xcj)  tj (P ) ;
for all i; j 2 S:
Remark 9 For each interpretation of the above three axioms, the most demand-
ing is GSIC while the least demanding is EPRR.20
A.2 Proof of propositions and theorems
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition: LMR and Solidarity imply Average Damage Pricing.
Proof. Let P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P; dene AD : R+ ! R, ~X 7! [D(X)=X] ~X
the linear function determined by the average damage at X, and consider the
following functions:
D^() = supfD;ADg; and
D() = inffD;ADg
By construction, D  D;AD  D^ with D(0) = D^(0) = 0 and D(X) = D^(X) =
D(X). By budget balance and Solidarity, these inequalities imply that transfers
should be the same whether the damage function is D or AD. Lastly, the result
follows by applying LMR to the fact that AD is linear.
A.2.2 The Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism
Denition 3 Egalitarian Equivalent transfer:
For any P 2 P and any reference vector of irrelevant characteristics

~b; ~xp; ~xc

:
nHR-EE For any i 2 N ,
tnHR EEi (P ) = bi (x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ~b (~xp; xci ) +
1
ni
[D (X) D (X   nixci )]
 
mX
j=1
nj
N
h
bj
 
xpj ; x
c
j
  ~b  ~xp; xcji
  1
N
0@ mX
j=1

D (X) D  X   njxcj D(X)
1A :
20See Fleurbaey and Bossert [6].
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GF-EE For any i 2 N ,
tGF EEi = bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ~b
 
~xp; xGFi + ~x
p

+
1
ni

D (X) D  X   nixGFi 
 
mX
j=1
nj
N
h
bj(x
p
j ; x
c
j)  ~b
 
~xp; xGFj + ~x
p
i
  1
N
0@ mX
j=1

D (X) D  X   njxGFj  D(X)
1A :
ES-EE For any i 2 N ,
tES EEi (P ) = bi (x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ~b (~xp; ~xc)
  1
N
0@ mX
j=1
nj
h
bj
 
xpj ; x
c
j
  ~b (~xp; ~xc)i D(X)
1A :
For each of the four views, the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism is charac-
terized by the appropriate combination of GSIC and ECRIC.
Theorem 3 A mechanism, t, satises nHR-GSIC and nHR-ECRIC if and
only if
t = tnHR EE :
A mechanism, t, satises GF-GSIC and GF-ECRIC if and only if
t = tGF EE :
A mechanism, t, satises ES-GSIC and ES-ECRIC if and only if
t = tES EE :
Proof. We prove the result under the HR viewpoint, but the proof technique
is similar for the other "views".
It is easily checked that tHR EE satises the required axioms. Conversely,
let P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P, let ~b be a reference benet function and denote
~P = (n; (~b; :::;~b); d; xp; xc): For all k = 1; :::;m  1, dene
P k = (n; (b1; :::; bk;~b; :::;~b); d; x
p; xc);
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and let Pm = P:
By Anonymity and ECRIC, we know that the contribution of country i;
ti

~P

  D (X) D (X i)
ni
should not depend upon country i in the global warming problem ~P By budget
balance, it follows that:
ti( ~P ) = [D (X) D (X i)] =ni
+
1
N
0@D(X)  X
j=1:::m
[D (X) D (X j)]
1A ;
for all i 2 N .
Next, switching from global warming problems ~P to P 1, GSIC writes
ti
 
P 1
  ti  ~P = ~b (xp1; xc1)  t1  ~P  b1 (xp1; xc1)  t1  P 1 ;
for all i 6= 1. This yields:
t1
 
P 1
  t1  ~P = 1  n1
N
 h
b1(x
p
1; x
c
1)  ~b (xp1; xc1)
i
and
ti
 
P 1
  ti  ~P = n1
N
h
~b (xp1; x
c
1)  b1 (xp1; xc1)
i
;
for all i 6= 1:Moving up from P 1 to P 2 and applying again GSIC gives
t2
 
P 2
  t2  P 1 = 1  n2
N
 h
b2 (x
p
2; x
c
2)  ~b (xp2; xc2)
i
;
so that
t2
 
P 2
  t2  ~P = b2 (xp2; xc2)  ~b (xp2; xc2)
+
2X
k=1
nk
N
h
~b
 
xpk; x
1
k
  bk (xpk; xck)i :
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Successively applying GSIC while moving up to Pn = P yields the result:
ti (P )  ti

~P

= bi (x
p
i ; x
c
i )  ~b (xpi ; xci )
 
X
j=1:::m
nj
N
h
bj
 
xpj ; x
c
j
  ~b  xpj ; xcji :
Note that the damage function, D, does not enter in this proof because the HR
view on responsibility considers countries to be responsible of all emissions
past and current and their resulting damage. By contrast, the Egalitarian
Equivalent mechanism redistributes along the dimensions for which countries
are not responsible.
A.2.3 The Conditionally Equivalent mechanism
Denition 4 The Conditionally Equivalent transfer:
For any P 2 P and any reference vector of relevant characteristics ~xc 2 R+:
nHR-CE For any i 2 N ,
tnHR CEi = bi(x
p
i ; ~x
c) + (xci   ~xc)
0@D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
1A
  1
N
0@X
j
njbj(x
p
j ; ~x
c) D

~X
1A ;
where ~X =
P
j njx
p
j +N ~x
c:
GF-CE For any i 2 N ,
tGF CE = bi(x
p
i ; ~x
GF + xpi ) +

xGFi   ~xGF
0@D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
1A
  1
N
0@ X
j=1:::m
bj(x
p
j ; ~x
GF + xpj ) D

~X
1A ;
where ~X = (1 + )Xp +N ~xGF and ~xGF = ~xc   ~xp:
ES-CE For any i 2 N ,
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tES CEi (P ) = bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i ) 
1P
j nj
0@X
j
njbj(x
p
j ; x
c
j) D(X)
1A :
In fact, in all four interpretations, the Conditionally Equivalent mechanism
is characterized by the appropriate combination of FRR and EPRR.
Theorem 4 A mechanism, t, satises nHR-FRR and nHR-EPRR if and
only if
t = tnHR CE :
A mechanism, t, satises GF-FRR and GF-EPRR if and only if
t = tGF CE :
A mechanism, t, satises ES-EPRR if and only if
t = tES CE :
Proof. We prove the result using the HR viewpoint, but the proof technique
is similar for the other "views".
It is easily checked that tHR CE satises the required axioms. Conversely, let
P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P consider a reference emissions schedule (~xp; ~xc) 2 R2+.
Denote ~P = (n; b; d; ~xp  1m; ~xc  1m).
For all k = 1; :::;m  1, dene
P k = (n; b; d; (xp1; :::; x
p
k; ~x
p; :::; ~xp); (xc1; :::; x
c
k; ~x
c; :::; ~xc)) ;
and let Pm = P:
Let ~X, Xk and X be the emissions levels associated with ~P , the P ks and Pm
respectively.
By Anonymity, budget balance, and EPRR,
ti( ~P ) = bi(~x
p; ~xc)  1P
j2N nj
0@X
j2N
njbj(~x
p; ~xc) D

~X
1A ;
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for all i 2 N .
Next, switching from global warming problem ~P to P 1, FRR yields:
t1
 
P 1
  (x1   ~x)
0@D  X1 D

~X

X1   ~X
1A = t1  ~P ;
and ti
 
P 1

= ti( ~P ); for all i > 1.
Next, switching from P k to P k+1 yields
tj
 
P k+1
  (xj   ~x)
0@D  Xk+1 D

~X

Xk+1   ~X
1A = tj  ~P ;
for all j  k and tj
 
P k+1

= tj

~P

otherwise.
The result follows:
ti (P ) = (xi   ~x)
0@D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
1A+ ti( ~P )
= bi(~x
p; ~xc) + (xi   ~x)
0@D (X) D

~X

X   ~X
1A
  1P
j2N nj
0@X
j2N
njbj(~x
p; ~xc) D

~X
1A :
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A.3 Additional Appendix (not intended for nal publica-
tion)
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition: No cost-sharing mechanism satises FMR, unless the damage
function, D, is linear in total emissions, X:
Proof. We prove the result along the HR viewpoint, but the proof technique
is similar for the other views on responsibility.
Let P = (n; b; d; xp; xc) 2 P and let ;  6= 0 such that  +  6= 0. Consider
the global warming problem P^ = (n; b; d; x^p; x^c) with x^p + x^c = xp + xc +
(; ; 0; :::; 0): Denote by P =

n; b; d; xp[]; x
c
[]

and P =

n; b; d; xp[]; x
c
[]

the "interim" global warming problems such that xp[] + x
c
[] = x
p + xc +
(; 0; :::; 0) and xp[] + x
c
[] = x
p + xc + (0; ; 0; :::; 0), respectively. Similarly,we
denote by X and X the total emissions associated with P and P , respec-
tively.
By FMR applied to P and P, it must be that
n1t1 (P)  n1t1 (P ) = D (X) D (X) ;
and ti (P) = ti (P ) for all i 6= 1: Next, by applying FMR to P and P^ , it follows
that:
n1t1

P^

  n1t1 (P ) = D (X + ) D (X) ; and
n2t2

P^

  n2t2 (P ) = D (X + + ) D (X + ) ;
and ti

P^

= ti (P ) all i 6= 1; 2:
Similarly, by applying FMR from P to P^ via P , we get:
n1t1

P^

  n1t1 (P ) = D (X + + ) D (X + ) ; and
n2t2

P^

  n2t2 (P ) = D (X + ) D (X)
and ti

P^

= ti (P ) all i 6= 1; 2:
The above implications are only compatible if
D (X + ) D (X) = D (X + + ) D (X + ) :
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Linearity of D follows.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition: Suppose D is linear. GSIC and FMR are incompatible unless all
benet functions are identical up to a constant; i.e, unless there exists a vector
 2 Rn and a function h : R2+ ! R such that
bi(x
p
i ; x
c
i ) = i + h(x
p
i ; x
c
i )
for all (xpi ; x
c
i ) 2 R2+:
Proof. The proof technique is adapted from that of Lemma 1in Bossert (1995).
Because D is linear, denote by  its damage rate: D(X) = X. Let P =
(n; b; d; x) 2 P and let (~xp; ~xc) 2 R2+ be some reference emissions level. Through-
out the proof, n and d will remain constant, so that we will identify P with its
benet-emissions prole, (b; xp; xc). Dene
(b; xp; xc)1;1 = [(b1; x
p
1; x
c
1); (b1; x
p
2; x
c
2); :::; (b1; x
p
m; x
c
m)];
(b; xp; xc)1;m = (b; xp; xc)
and, for all k 2 f1; :::;m  1g :
(b; xp; xc)1;k = [(b1; x
p
1; x
c
1); (b2; x
p
2; x
c
2); :::(bk; x
p
k; x
c
k); (b1; x
p
k+1; x
c
k+1); :::; (b1; x
p
m; x
c
m)]:
For each k = 1; :::;m, denote by P 1;k the global warming problem corresponding
to (b; xp; xc)1;k. Recalling that xi = x
p
i + x
c
i and that ~x = ~x
p + ~xc, it follows
from FMR that:
t1(P
1;1)  t1( ~P 1) = (x1   ~x);
with ~P 1 = (n; (b1; :::; b1); d; ~xp  1m; ~xc  1m): Next, applying GSIC iteratively
yields
t1(P ) = t1( ~P
1) + (x1   ~x)   1
m
mX
k=2
(bk(x
p
k; x
c
k)  b1(xpk; xck)): (3)
Similarly, dene
(b; xp; xc)2;1 = [(b2; x
p
1; x
c
1); (b2; x
p
2; x
c
2); :::; (b2; x
p
m; x
c
m)];
(b; xp; xc)2;m = (b; xp; xc)
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and, for all k 2 f1; :::;m  1g :
(b; xp; xc)2;k = [(b1; x
p
1; x
c
1); (b2; x
p
2; x
c
2); :::(bk; x
p
k; x
c
k); (b2; x
p
k+1; x
c
k+1); :::; (b2; x
p
m; x
c
m)]:
For each k = 1; :::;m, denote by P 2;k the global warming problem corresponding
to (b; xp; xc)2;k. It follows from FMR that:
t1(P
2;1)  t1( ~P 2) = (x1   ~x)
with ~P 2 = (n; (b2; :::; b2); d; ~xp  1m; ~xc  1m): Next, applying GSIC iteratively
yields
t1(P ) = t1( ~P
2) + (x1   ~x)   1
m
X
k=1;3;:::;m
(bk(x
p
k; x
c
k)  b2(xpk; xck)) (4)
Combining expressions (3) and (4) leads to
b2(x
p
2; x
c
2)  b1(xp2; xc2) = m(t1( ~P 1)  t2( ~P 2)) +
X
k=1;3;::;m
(bk(x
p
k; x
c
k)  b2(xpk; xck))
 
mX
k=3
(bk(x
p
k; x
c
k)  b1(xpk; xck)):
The right-hand side of the equation being independent of (xp2; x
c
2), it follows
that b1 and b2 are identical up to a constant. Repeating the argument yields
the result.
A.3.3 Incompatibility between ECRIC and EPRR
Proposition 4 EPRR and ECRIC are incompatible unless D is linear.
Proof. We establish the proof by contradiction under the HR view. Consider
a transfer scheme, t, satisfying both EPRR and ECRIC. Let ~x and ~b be the
reference emissions levels and the reference benet function, respectively. Con-
sider any global warming problem P where x = ~x  1m and b = ~b  1m. Invoking
EPRR and ECRIC together yields, for all i; j 2 S:
bi(xi) ti(P )+ti(P ) D(X) D(X i)
ni
= bj(xj) tj(P )+tj(P ) D(X) D(X j)
nj
;
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which yields the following, upon recalling that bi(xi) = bj(xj) = ~b(~x) :
D( ~X) D( ~X   ni~x)
ni
=
D( ~X) D( ~X   nj ~x)
nj
:
Unless D is linear, one can construct a global warming problem with ni 6= nj
such that the above expression does not hold.
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